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In this paper, the author wants to compare two well-known approaches to de-
termining the nature of meaning: ‘descriptive’ and ‘causal’, pointing out their 
principal difficulties and after that offer an option of establishing the meaning 
adopted in structural linguistics. On the author’s opinion, the structural ap-
proach would allow us, first of all, to better clarify the causes of the difficulties 
arising in descriptive and causal theories, namely, how it is possible to fix the 
meaning of an object, and second, to show why these difficulties are fundamen-
tally unattainable. It is precisely the last point that author would like to try to 
defend. 
Key words: Meaning, Descriptivist theory of meaning, Causal Theory, Struc-
tural Linguistics.
1. The Problem of Meaning in Descriptive and Causal Theories
The object of discussion in descriptive and causal theories is a traditional 
question of philosophy: how are meanings established, and namely, is the 
meaning a set of specific attributes or is it only a reference to a specific object? In 
other words, what is the correlation between concepts and objects? Why water 
is identified with the word »water«? The first approach is traditionally called 
descriptivist theory of meaning (G. Frege, B. Russell, J. Searle), and the second 
one is causal (S. Kripke, H. Putnam, K. Donnellan). In terms of descriptivist 
theory of meaning, under the name ‘water’ we mean a set of specific features, 
based on the knowledge of which we can recognize other objects in reality, 
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and which are endowed with a given set of attributes, (Russel 1905, 1927). The 
particular liquid in the glass is identified by the word ‘water’ because it has the 
features that are provided under the concept of ‘water’. In a sense, this posi-
tion is best consistent with common sense. Causal theory, in turn, resolves 
the problem of establishing the meaning in another way: the concept is con-
nected to the object absolutely arbitrary, in the process of initial ‘acquaintance’. 
(Kripke 2011). In this case, no attributes of the object are taken into account. 
In order to better understand the difference between the first and the second 
approaches, we can compare how we give an object its determination in the 
descriptive and causal theories. According to the logic of the first approach we 
should say that “water is a liquid having a specific chemical composition and 
physical properties.” According to the logic of the second, it would be enough 
to say that “water is water.” It is clear, then, that for the descriptivist theory of 
meaning the definition would appear in the subject-predicate form, where the 
description is to be a predicate, while for the causal theory definition is a tau-
tology. Or in another words, in the descriptivist theory of meaning the content 
plan has a logical priority over the expression plan, while in the causal theory 
it is the opposite. At first glance, it might seem that, since the causal theory 
seems rather counterintuitive, preference should be given to the descriptivist 
theory of meaning. 
However, we shall immediately see the problems of descriptive approach, 
as soon as we ask the following question. Let’s assume that in the course of a 
global literary examination it was revealed that Shakespeare did not write any 
of the works attributed to him, but they were all created by his sister. Will this 
mean that the name ‘Shakespeare’ from now on does not mean Shakespeare, 
an Englishman, since the real Shakespeare is the author of, at least, Hamlet? 
Our linguistic instincts tell us that we shall continue to call Shakespeare 
Shakespeare, although experiencing some disappointment. Obviously, saving 
the name is possible, perhaps, only because in reality we never defined Shake-
speare as Hamlet’s author, but we defined it through a tautology “Shakespeare 
is Shakespeare.” Now imagine that the same ‘revelation’ comes with an object 
that is not denoted with a single name (Shakespeare), but with a common name, 
for example, with the object of ‘water’. Say, in the course of further scientific 
discoveries it was revealed that the composition of water has a slightly different 
formula, and its effect on organisms has a different nature than it was previ-
ously thought (Linsky 1977). What happens in this case – will the ‘water’ now 
mean something else and not the object with which we quench our thirst? Here 
the answer is not so obvious: on the one hand, we can insist that we should 
keep the name ‘water’ for a specific object, while on the other hand, and in this 
case it is a more natural solution, that the name should be changed. 
The difficulty of the present situation, however, is that establishing general 
concepts, as opposed to individual, involves an explicit definition (description), 
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otherwise, we put our name on the list admitting that we do not know what 
we are dealing with when naming objects and every time we have to deal with 
something like a ‘black box’. This situation can be easily accepted in case of 
proper names (Saul Kripke is called ‘Saul Kripke’ just because everyone calls 
him so, I might know nothing about him as a person, but continue calling him 
by that name), but it is much more complicated in case of such names like 
‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘cat’, ‘gold’, ‘water’, ‘warmth’, etc., since it is assumed that we 
understand the content of these objects every time we give them a name.
In the history of this issue there were some attempts to establish different 
rules for nominating different object classes. In case of individual names it was 
suggested to use the technique of causal theories (the names do not change, 
even if the whole set of their distinctive features is changed), and in case of 
common names – the descriptive theories technique (a change in the content 
of the meaning should lead to a change of name) (Salmon 2005). However, this 
solution somehow simplifies the situation. The fact is that the positions of both 
descriptive and causal approaches can be applied to the whole range of mean-
ings, no matter whether they are individual or general concepts. Thus, within 
the frame of descriptive analysis proper names can be explained as hidden 
descriptions. For example, the name ‘Paris’ has a meaning for us only if we 
understand that it is a capital of France. In turn, the causal theory can always 
appeal to the fact that even if we are talking about general concepts, it would 
be absurd to claim to know all about an object in order to call it somehow. For 
example, we do not know all about water from the start, but still find it possible 
to call it somehow in the act of ‘preliminary acquaintance’.
Kripke also believes that it is not the difference between the rules or the fact 
that individual names function in the language differently in comparison with 
common names (Kripke 2011). It seems Kripke’s position consists in develop-
ing a general theory of nomination and showing how the problem of ‘float-
ing’ meanings  can be eliminated. His solution implies verifying the existence 
of such names, ‘rigid designators’, that denote the same object in all possible 
worlds. Obviously, all singular names will be rigid designators; for example, 
the concept of ‘the smallest natural number’ can signify only one object and it 
should be so in all possible worlds. The situation is not so easy in case of general 
concepts, within which Kripke distinguishes the so-called ‘natural kinds’. He 
shows that rigid designation also acts in relation to them regardless of whether 
we know that water is H2O, and heat is a movement of molecules; if these state-
ments are true, water will always (in all possible worlds) mean H2O, and heat 
will mean the movement of molecules (Kripke 2011).
The central problem of the causal theory is to determine what specifies the 
identity of the point of interest, regardless of any change in its distinctive fea-
tures, what makes an object identical to itself, even if all of its properties are 
changed. In a sense, causal approach attempts to find an objective correlative 
Diana Gasparyan, The Paradoxes of Reference in Descriptive, Causal...186
to the ‘rigid designator’ – a name that denotes the same object in any of pos-
sible worlds. This formulation of the task, in fact, coincides with a traditional 
philosophical problem of detecting essential qualities of objects known from 
the classical metaphysics. Kripke, however, positions his method not as meta-
physical essentialism, but as scientific essentialism, indicating that detection of 
rigid designation is possible only for natural species (besides names), i.e. pre-
cisely for the objects of scientific knowledge (Kripke 2011). It seems to us that 
clarification of such a position of his lies in the fact that an essential attribute of 
an object will by only the feature (truly) established in the course of a scientific 
investigation.
I, however, believe that it would be more correct to characterize Kripke’s 
‘scientific essentialism’ as ‘linguistic essentialism’ because his essentialism be-
comes  possible only thanks to the very fact of naming. The name itself, with its 
meaning, gives the object its identity. In turn, Kripke seems to proceed from 
the fact that the identity of an object is defined not by its name, but rather by 
the true state of affairs, and the presence of rigid designator only reflects this 
fact. Below I will try to provide rationale for the direct role the name plays in 
ensuring the identity of the object, referring to the definition of meaning in 
structural linguistics; along the way I will also explain why 1) the consistent 
essentialism of meaning is unattainable, and 2) the problem that descriptivism 
and anti-descriptivism are trying to solve may have no solution.
2. Meaning in Structural Linguistics
In order to do this I will need to deploy an anti-essential subtext of meaning 
in structural linguistics, which I will call the principle of desubstantiation of 
meaning. It lies in the fact that, contrary to the classical view of the object as a 
certain thing, physical or ideal, the object is not a thing – something that you 
can point at. Objects are not entities or substances in the classical sense. In 
order to understand this principle, we must ask: what determines the meaning 
of an object? If someone asks “what is a table?” we have two ways of answering 
this question. The first is to point our finger at a nearby table with the words 
“This is a table.” The second is to define the ‘table’; moreover, it should be done 
in such a way that the person who asked the question would be able to correctly 
identify the ‘table’ in any other corresponding object. The first method cannot 
be considered satisfactory, since pointing at a specific ‘table’ does not mean 
pointing at the essence of the ‘table’. When we ask about the meaning of a cer-
tain object, we are interested in such a definition that may be used collectively 
to identify all other instances of the same entity. In this case, what does ‘defin-
ing the table’ mean? If we cannot simply point at it, then we have to describe or 
characterize it. Both can be done only by means of language, in other words, we 
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must talk about the table as a concept. Now, asking about the meaning of the 
table, we have to ask about the meaning of the concept of ‘table’. And then we 
have to figure out how meanings are formed and distributed  in the language. 
In turn, in order to answer this question, let us try to fix the process of sig-
nification in the language at its most elementary levels, i.e. let us find out what 
constitutes the meaning of the minimal element of the language – the phoneme 
(letter). For example, we are interested in the meaning of the letter “R”. Equally, 
we can ask: what is the essence of the “R”? The simplicity of this object should 
not confuse us – if the object exists, it should have essence. So, what does it 
mean to be such an object as an “R”? We are well aware that “R” can be written 
in ink on paper or in chalk on the blackboard, it can be displayed in blue color, 
or in red, it may have a different typeface, such as “R” or “R”, but in all these 
cases, we recognize it as the same “R”, and not a lot of different objects. For 
example, the well-known and widely used Turing test designed to distinguish 
computer robots from humans is built on the very effect of various typeface of 
characters (letters or numbers): a human copes with the task of identifying the 
object, while computer does not (Duch et al. 2008). That said, the human ability 
to recognize the signs in his everyday speech practice, regardless of the way of 
their execution seems almost a miracle, and, in many respects, the structural 
theory of meaning is intended to give a rational explanation of this ‘miracle’. 
What is the essence of the letter “A” if neither form, nor color, nor its record-
ing conditions, nor pronunciation (as an acoustic object the “A” can also be 
pronounced briefly or as a singsong, quietly or loudly, by a male or female voice, 
etc.) are involved in this? Structural linguistics gives us the following answer: 
the meaning of a phoneme is determined by its place in the system (Saussure 
1983). This place is the same as function, method of usage1, or the ability of 
being substituted (replaced) with another phoneme from the given system of 
phonemes. The “A” is nothing more than the ability to be any other letter from 
the totality of the letters of the Russian alphabet. The fact that the “A” is-not 
either “B” or “M” is its very essence. In the words of the founder of structural 
linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure in this regard, “the difference of one sign from 
the others is all that it is.” (Saussure 1985). Let us note once again that a sign 
has nothing essential (ontological, substantial) that distinguishes it from the 
‘essence’ of another sign. The difference is not substantial but formal – the sign 
1 Saussure’s concept of meaning is consistent with Wittgenstein’s concept of meaning as a “lan-
guage-related method of usage.” For example, the word ‘running’ does not have a substantial 
meaning. If we say, “running means moving in space with the help of legs,” then such expres-
sions as “ships run at sea,” “trains do not run regularly,” would be meaningless. Meanwhile, they 
make sense. If we refine our definition and say “running means moving in space,” then we save 
the two expressions mentioned above from being meaningless but again encounter difficulties 
with the expression “the clock runs as new.” These examples are meant to clarify the idea of 
Wittgenstein – the meanings of a notion are nothing more than a set of specific instances of its 
use in the language (Wittgenstein 2001). 
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“A” is a sign “A” because it is not a sign “B” (“C”.... “Z”) Thus, the ‘essence’ of the 
sign is its difference from the others, which in fact creates this sign as separate. 
In general, the linguistic model offers such a view at the essence of a thing (its 
meaning) when it is determined not by its positive content, but through the 
negative (differential) – in relation to the essences of other things (their mean-
ings) (Benveniste 1971). 
Thus, “being a certain thing” is equivalent to “having a certain meaning” 
(because the essence of the thing first of all answers the question “what is it?”), 
and the meaning, in its turn, is not a quality, but a reference procedure, it is not 
a label of the thing but it opposes some signs against others. We are talking 
about the effect of mutual substitution (replacement) – meaning is something 
that replaces the absence of other meanings, and that is why each specific ob-
ject is endowed with meaning exactly to the extent it can be replaced with 
another.
This statement can be explained by an example from linguistic analysis. 
In the sentence “A man is able to speak” each word could be substituted with 
some alternative. For example, “A man (bird/fish) is able (can/wants) to read 
(sing/swim).” It is thanks to this phenomenon that each word has a specific 
meaning. In turn, the ‘to’ of the infinitive verb cannot be replaced in this sen-
tence, because it would lead to a distortion in the grammatical construction of 
the sentence, and in this sense it has no meaning (Jakobson 1978).
Let us consider a few more examples to illustrate the above. Chess was a fa-
vorite illustration of Saussure, because its nature is similar to the nature of the 
language – it is a closed system consisting of a finite number of elements and 
a limited number of rules for their use. Let’s try to find out what is the essence 
of a certain chess piece. Suppose we have to find the essence of the ‘rook’. What 
could it be? Clearly, every chess piece can be made  of the most diverse mate-
rials – wood, glass, ice, wax or chocolate. Therefore, the substrate is not the 
essence of the piece. Then, perhaps, a specific form of the piece serves as such? 
However, is this form of the rook so important? There is a huge variety of chess 
pieces execution, not to mention the fact that we could easily make ourselves 
busy with playing chess just by signing small pieces of paper and arranging 
them in the correct order on the chess board. Consequently, the form does not 
specify the nature of the pieces either. Then what does it mean ‘being a rook’? 
Neither more nor less than a certain location in the system of chess pieces, i.e. 
the difference from all the others, each of which, in turn, is also opposed to all 
the rest. This method “first, refuses to treat the members of the relationship as 
independent entities and, by contrast, takes as a basis of its analysis the rela-
tionships among them; and, second, it introduces the concept of system, taking 
as a basis the demand of its self-closedness” (Saussure 1985).
Thus, the principle of desubstantiation refuses to treat objects as indepen-
dent entities, but takes as a basis the relationships among them. In this sense, 
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there is no substance, if you mean by it a fixed and self-sufficient content taken 
by itself, but there are meanings  – the values  that are differentiated in relation 
to each other. 
Now let’s return to the original example with the table. In the desubstantia-
tive logic of Saussure we should say about the meaning of the concept of the 
‘table’: this concept has a meaning not because of some quality characteristics 
that are inherent to it, but due to the fact that ‘table’ as a concept is opposed 
to all the other units of the vocabulary of concepts in this specific language. 
Thus, concepts are also “purely differential and defined not by their positive 
content, but negatively by their relationship to other parts of the system” (Sau-
ssure 1985). 
Thus, according to the principle of desubstantiation we should totally opt 
out of the rhetoric of substantiation in relation to meanings. Meanings  are not 
the same entities as the objects of the physical world. Their existence is not 
substantial, but ‘differential’ as they say in structural linguistics.
3. Conclusion: Can the Problem of Meaning be Solved?
How is the aforesaid related to the questions we asked above? I can imagine 
that, taking into account the differential and beyond-essential character of the 
meaning (if we accept the statements formulated by structural linguistics), it 
can be said that the identity of an object in all possible worlds is only ensured 
by the fact that this object does have a name. The main focus here is that the 
name does not appear after the appearance of the object, but the object itself ap-
pears after the name (naming) has appeared. Names create things; they are not 
attached to things as a secondary procedure of denoting. Then it is only natural 
that one and the same name will denote one and the same object in all possible 
worlds – because the name itself does not change, and as soon as it appears, 
it ‘pulls’ behind it the object formed by this very name. This move resembles a 
lot Kant’s questioning of “how possible” is our belief in the necessity of some 
synthetic judgments (Kant 1902). Kant’s answer is that it is possible because we 
ourselves originally set the form of experience (synthetic knowledge) that gives 
us the desired apodicticity. Structural approach uses the same analogy – the 
apodictic identity of the object and the name is connected with the fact that 
we originally specified the object by the very name. This fact ensures us that 
in all possible worlds a certain name denotes one and the same object (has one 
and the same meaning). It will happen so because despite some counterintu-
itiveness any word does not have some substantial, independent meaning, but 
depends on the other words that could be taking its place. In order to render 
the meaning of a sign, it is enough to interpret it with a second sign, which, 
in turn, refers to the third sign. Native speakers learn the meanings of words 
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because they use the same linguistic mechanism – the language, which is a 
closed system differentiated on the basis of mutual references. Based on these 
considerations, we can try to make a clean break from the fetish interpretations 
of meaning. Then the meaning will be what is established by the system of the 
language (its internal order and distribution of elements), and not by an exter-
nal relation of the sign to the real thing or internal description. The concepts of 
the language acquire their meaning not thanks to the ‘world’, whether internal 
or external, but thanks to the vocabulary. 
From this argument we can also conclude that the problem, which is being 
solved by descriptive and causal theories, is truly “a hard problem of refer-
ence.” Both the former and the latter approaches seek to discover that some-
thing giving the identity to the object. This can be a particular intentional 
content, i.e. a set of permanent predications (in case of descriptivism) or an 
extensional causal connection leading us to the initial baptism that associ-
ated the name with the object (in case of causal theory). However, if we take 
into account the structural theory of meaning in which the meaning is not 
something substantial and positively objective, but only a place in the system 
of signification, that is, in fact, a purely structural effect, the difficulty of find-
ing an unambiguous solution to the problem of identity both in descriptive 
and anti-descriptive strategies becomes more transparent. Perhaps the ab-
sence of a solution that would satisfy everybody is connected precisely with 
the objective approach of both schools. They seek either a quality (essential 
description) or a name (rigid designator). However it may well be that it does 
not make any sense to look for something substantive in a structurally given 
meaning, and therefore, the task set by the general theory of nomination may 
not have a solution. On the contrary, if we agree that meaning is not a positive 
entity, we can add some more clarity to the problem of nomination. The final 
answer to the question “what ensures the identity of the meaning?” from the 
point of view of structural linguistics is the following statement: the ‘identity’ 
is not specified by a bundle of descriptions or a specific name, but by the 
totality of the language system forming the meaning through the process of 
mutual differentiation and replacement of its elements. The paradox of this 
answer lies in the fact that ‘identity’ here can be only placed in inverted com-
mas, because it is traditionally introduced as something of substance (es-
sential), while in case of structural approach, we can have ‘identity’ (‘table’ 
means a table for all Russian speakers), but we would not find any substantial 
quality of the table. This happens due to the fact that “the language itself 
is not a substance, but a form” (Saussure 1985). In the language, like in any 
other semiotic system, something that differentiates one sign from the other 
exhausts all its contents and, therefore, it is the difference that creates mean-
ing and retains it exactly to the extent in which the language itself retains its 
form. 
Nova prisutnost 11 (2013) 2, 183-191 191
References
Benveniste, E. (1971), Problems in General Linguistics, University of Miami Press.
Duch, W. et al. (2008), Cognitive Architectures: Where Do We Go from Here, Frontiers 
in Artificial Intelligence and Applications (Proc. 1st AGI Conference), vol. 171, 
122-136. 
Jakobson, R. (1978), Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, Harvester Press.
Kant, I. (1902), Prolegomena, trans. Paul Carus, Chicago. 
Kripke, S. (2011), Collected Papers, vol. I, New York: Oxford University Press.
Linsky, L. (1977), Names and Descriptions, Chicago.
Russel, B. (1905), On Denoting, Mind, vol. 14.
Russel, B. (1927), Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell, New York: Modern Library.
Salmon, N. (2005), Reference an Essence, NY.
Saussure, F. (1983), Course in General Linguistics, eds. Charles Bally and Albert Seche-
haye, trans. Roy Harris, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. 
Wittgenstein, L. (2001), Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell Publishing.
Diana Gasparyan
Paradoksi značenja u deskriptivnim, kauzalnim i strukturalističkim teorijama
Summary
U ovom radu autorica uspoređuje dva poznata pristupa određenju prirode zna-
čenja: opisni (deskriptivni) i uzročni (kauzalni). Autorica ističe važne poteškoće 
tih pristupa i nudi opciju utvrđivanja značenja koja je usvojena u strukturalistič-
koj lingvistici. Autorica smatra da će nam strukturalistički pristup omogućiti, 
prvo, da bolje pojasnimo uzroke poteškoća koje se javljaju kod deskriptivnih 
i kauzalnih teorija, tj. kako je moguće odrediti značenje objekta, i drugo, da 
pokažemo zašto su ove poteškoće u temelju neodržive. Autorica napose brani 
ovu drugu točku.
Ključne riječi: značenje, deskriptivna teorija značenja, kauzalna teorija znače-
nja, strukturalistička lingvistika. 
(na hrv. preveo Dalibor Renić)
